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THE 1966 DEFENSE. WHITE PAPER
"i Above all the Government can, and must, decide in
broad terms what sort of role Britain should play
in the world in ten years time, and what part its
military forces should play in supporting that role.
In short, it has to decide what sort of military
capability is likely to make political sense.
1
Thus, the Labor Government asked some basic questions
concerning Britain's world role in its 1966 Defense White
Paper. The White Paper was the result of an extensive
review of Britain's resources and commitments, and it set
forth a defense program for the 1970 's. It attempted to
define the role which Britain would play on the world scene
in the 1970 's, and it outlined the kind of military estab-
lishment which would support this role.
The making of such an evaluation of role and capa-
bility would be a major undertaking for any nation. It was
perhaps an even greater step for the Government of the
United Kingdom to take because of the position occupied by
"Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Part I.
The Defence Review," Parliamentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 2901
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), p. 4.
Hereinafter cited as Cmnd. 2901. It will be noted that
British spellings are used throughout this thesis in matter
directly quoted from British sources and in the titles of
those sources. Additionally, it should be noted that Par-
liamentary Command Papers are cited in the first instance




2Britain and its military forces over the last two centuries.
The 1966 White Paper asked, in effect, whether a nation
which for centuries had been either the most powerful, or
among the most powerful, in the world was willing to accept
a second-class status. It is not unnatural that such a
question should generate a heated and sometimes violent
discussion in the country's policy-making establishment.
The voice of this establishment, The Times
, headlined its
article on the debate over the White Paper as follows:
2
"Defence Debate Ends in Uproar." The article under this
headline provides considerable evidence to support it:
Pandemonium swept over the Commons in a surge of
partisan emotion during the closing minutes before
the final division of the present Parliament last
night. Mr. Healey, the Secretary of State for
Defence, stood at the dispatch box for minutes on
end shouting into a wall of Opposition noise that
left him completely inaudible. Mr. Heath, the Oppo-
sition leader, set an example to his rank and file
by leaning forward angrily in his seat to shout
challenges to the Treasury bench that were no more
audible.
3
The Defense White Paper caused concern and discus-
sion not only in Great Britain, but in the United States as
well. U. S. policy makers were naturally interested in the
future defense plans of one of our most valuable allies,
p
especially since British policy East of Suez is considerably
The Times ^/late London air editioji/, March 9, 1966,




3involved with our own policy in South East Asia. The White
Paper provides the outline for British defense policy for
the next decade, and it merits study from both the British
and U. S. points of view.
The White Paper purports to set forth Britain's
defense policy; this thesis will examine that policy in an
attempt to discover whether it is representative of tradi-
tional British defense policy or whether it signals a new
approach for the British in defense planning. Such an
examination requires first a look at the White Paper itself,
and this chapter will be devoted to this task. Chapters II
and III will review British defense policy from 1919 until
the present in order to discover the traditional elements
of that policy. The final chapter will evaluate the policy
set forth in the White Paper in the light of traditional
British policy in an attempt to isolate the traditional
from the new, and conclusions will be offered concerning
the real nature of the current policy.
I. THE MAJOR PREMISE
When the Wilson Government took office in October,
1964, a decision was made to conduct a thorough review of
Britain's defense needs for the decade of the 1970 's. This
review had two main purposes: "to relax the strain imposed
on the British economy by the .defence programme which* it

/the Government/ had inherited," and to shape the country's
defense posture for the 1970' s. The 1966 White Paper on
.defense is the result of the extensive review conducted by
the Government. The major premise on which the review was
based was that British defense spending would be brought to
a stable level of about 6 per cent of the Gross National
Product by 1969-1970. In effect, the review had to answer
the question as to what sort of a role could be played and
what sort of a military establishment could be had at that
particular price.
A ceiling on defense spending had been forecast by
the National Plan which had been published during the first
year of the Wilson Administration. The National Plan was
based on the fact that "Britain has one over riding economic
necessity. We must pay our way in the world and to do this
we must increase our production." In order for Britain to
pay its own way, the Government committed itself to spend
7
only what the national economy could afford, and reduction
of military spending overseas was listed as one area where
p
a saving would be brought about. The defense budget in
4Cmnd. 2901, p. 1. 5Ibid .
c
Department of Economic Affairs and the Central
Office of Information, Working for Prosperity
,
The National
Plan in Brief (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1965), p. 2.
7 8Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 9.
I
1969-1970 was forecast at two billion pounds or at about 6
9per cent of the Gross National Product.
It should be recognized, then, at the outset, that
the new defense plan was not based on price estimates
derived from the costing out of certain missions. Indeed,
missions were developed based on a finite monetary figure
which would be available for defense spending.
It follows from the major premise—a fixed ceiling
on defense spending—that commitments must be adjusted to
meet requirements set by the ceiling on spending. In addi-
tion, the White Paper honestly faces up to the fact that,
even at current levels of spending, the country's armed
forces are being asked to perform tasks for which they do
not have adequate resources. For example, the sea; harbor
ratio for destroyers and frigates in the Royal Navy de-
creased from one day at sea to four days in port in 1956-
1957, to one day at sea to one and one-half days in port in
1963-1964. For the same type ships, the average number of
days of twenty-four-hour steaming increased from almost
eighty to over one hundred forty during the same period.
In the Royal Air Force, the number of emergency moves of
operational formation to overseas theaters almost tripled
between 1963 and 1965—from 58 to 157. 10
9 10Ibid ., p. 23. Cmnd. 2901, p. 2.

6Figures such as these clearly indicate that Britain's
armed forces are being asked to perform tasks for which
resources are inadequate. This fact, along with the ceiling
on defense spending, requires further reduction in the role
of the defense establishment. The Government declared
its intention in the White Paper to reduce political commit-
ments as required to remain within its financial target and
to relax the overextension of forces which had resulted in
recruiting and re-enlistment declines and overly-long
family separations.
The White Paper puts the question to be answered by
the review as follows: "... what sort of military capa-
12bility makes political sense?" The question might be put
another way: what kind of military establishment is pos-
sible at a fixed price?
The Conservative Opposition was quick to attack the
major premise on which the defense review was based. The
Defense White Paper was released on February 22, 1966, and
the Secretary of State for Defense, Mr. Denis Healey, made
a brief statement concerning it in the House of Commons.
His statement was repeated for the benefit of the House of
Lords by the Minister of Defense for the Royal Air Force,
11 T , . ,Ibid .
12Cmnd. 2901, p. 4.

13Lord Shackleton. The Conservatives immediately attacked
the fact that the defense review set out plans for a defense
.policy which was based on the Labor Government's "absurd
preoccupation with fudging a figure of h 2,000 million in
1969-70 regardless of the consequences for the morale of the
14Services or the defence of the Country." In the House of
Lords, Lord Carrington, a sometime First Lord of the Ad-
miralty under the Macmillan Government, answered for the
Conservatives
:
It is a very grave Statement which, in my view, will
call into question, and does call into question, the
whole of Britain's position throughout the world
• • • •
First, those of us who sit on this side of the House
think it quite wrong to tackle the admittedly costly
and difficult problems of Defence by setting a finan-
cial target without regard to commitments. It may
be politically popular, but it is thoroughly irre-
sponsible. 15
The White Paper, after stating its major premise of
a two billion pound yearly spending ceiling, sets out
Britain's military role. There are three major issues






682, Cols. 239-241; Parliamentary Debates , Lords , Weekly
Hansard, No. 615, Cols. 112-115.
14Parliamentary Debates , Commons , Weekly Hansard,
No. 682, Col. 242. Mr. Enoch Powell, the shadow Defense
Minister, in reply for the Opposition.
Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Weekly Hansard, No.
615, Col. 115.

8separate items in this thesis: the Royal Navy, overseas
deployment of British forces a«d the independent nature of
.British defense policy. Before proceeding to these major
topics, however, a few observations on some less important
aspects of the White Paper would not be inappropriate.
As with many British policy statements on foreign
policy and defense policy, the United Nations and disarma-
ment provide an introductory section.
Recent history underlines the importance to Britain,
as to all other countries of strengthening the United
Nations as the main instrument for keeping peace
v r . . Most great Powers now realize that their own
security can only be safe-guarded in the long run by
halting the international arms race. 16
This having been said, the White Paper concludes
that the United Nations is an imperfect peace-keeper and
17that the arms race has not yet been halted. Therefore,
Cmnd. 2901, p. 4. The 1935 White Paper on Defense
contained a similar introduction. The first aim of British
foreign policy was proclaimed to be the establishment of
peace and the means to be employed included support of the
League of Nations and reduction and limitations of inter-
national armaments. See "White Paper of Defense Issued in
Connection with the House of Commons Debate on March 11,
1935," as found in "Security and Defense," International
Conciliation , No. 310, May, 1935, pp. 39-41. It is one of
the purposes of this thesis to draw conclusions concerning
t|ie differences, if any, between British defense policy in
1966 and 1935. Such conclusion will appear in a later
chapter; however, whether or not policy has changed, it is
fairly clear that the drafters of the current White Paper
have not significantly changed the introductory format which
was employed in 1935.
17Cmnd. 2901, p. 5.

9Britain must have a defense policy which goes beyond support
of the United Nations and arms control.
II. THE ROYAL NAVY
Much of the publicity which surrounded the publica-
tion of the White Paper was devoted to the Royal Navy.
Prior to its publication, it was obvious to all observers
of British political life that the White Paper would have
something to say about the future of aircraft carriers in
the Navy, and the issue of The Economist which came out the
week before the White Paper was made public concluded that
carriers were out.
But the Navy must swallow the essential point, which
is that most of the tasks to be performed by air
power can be done better from land bases than from
floating (and sinkable) symbols of senior-service
prestige. ^-°
The Minister of Defense for the Royal Navy, Mr.
Christopher Mayhew, was going to resign, so it was rumored,
because of the Government's determination to phase out
carriers. However, there was hope expressed in some quar-
ters that resignations could be avoided.
The Government has decided in favor of more aircraft
t
* rather than more aircraft carriers—a limit fixed
only by the financial ceiling which ministers have
felt forced to set on defence costs—and members of
18




the Cabinet were keeping their -fingers crossed ...
in the hope that neither Mr. Christopher Mayhew,
Minister of Defence for the Navy, nor any member of
the Navy Board, v/ould resign as a result of this
decision. The more stolid member's of the Cabinet
*/ gave their personal view that nobody would resign. •*-°
The day before the White Paper was to be made public,
The Times was able to publish Mr. Mayhew' s letter of resig-
nation, and the more stolid members of the Cabinet were
proved wrong. It was a "Dear Harold" letter, under date of
February 17, 1966, but it went further than was expected.
• • • I find myself unable to endorse the fundamental
political and strategic assumptions of our policy
which have been publicly indicated by Government
spokesmen as forming the basis of the review. 20
The Navy Minister was not resigning simply because
of the phase out of carrier aviation but because of disagree-
ment about the "fundamental political and strategic assump-
tions on which the Government's policy was based."
The White Paper declared that the Navy of the 1970 's
will exploit the "most modern technologies, particularly in
21
nuclear propulsion and guided missiles." The Polaris sub-
marines, with their operational readiness target date set in
1969-1970, are scheduled to take over from the Royal Air
Manchester Guardian Weekly ^/special air edition/,
February 17, 1966, p. 3, col. 1.
20 — —The Times /late London air edition/, February 21,
1966, p. 7, col. 5.
21Cmnd. 2901, p. 9.

11
Force responsibility for Britain's contribution of nuclear
forces to NATO. The submarine force of the 1970' s will
.have, said the White Paper, nuclear powered hunter-killer
submarines also. Thus, the submarine force of the 1970*
s
will have both nuclear and conventional powered boats; the
nuclear force v/ill have both Polaris and hunter-killer
capabilities.
The surface Navy of the 1970 f s also received atten-
22tion in the White Paper. The conversion of Tiger class
cruisers is scheduled to continue in order to increase
their anti-submarine capabilities. However, use of cruisers
for this purpose is a temporary measure since the White
Paper announced the prospective addition to the fleet of a
•new class of guided missile ship—the Type 82 destroyer--
which will have both surface-to-air missiles and an ASW
capability. The White Paper announced no significant change
in amphibious warfare ships and, by inference, the commando
carriers are to remain in commission.
In terms of its surface and submarine forces, the
Royal Navy did not fair badly in the White Paper. Nuclear
submarines and a new class of guided-missile all-purpose
t
surface ships certainly would tend to keep the Royal Navy





the White Paper dealt a serious blow to Navy prestige with
its decision on carriers. "The present carrier force will
continue well into the 1970* s; but we shall not build a new
'/ 2 3
carrier (CVA 01)." The end of aviation in the Royal
Navy—the Navy which led the world in development of the
techniques of carrier take-off and landing—was explained
in frank budgetary terms. "We also believe that the tasks
for which carrier-borne aircraft might be required in the
24later 1970' s can be more cheaply performed in other ways."
In his brief opening statement in the House of Commons
on the defense review, the Secretary of State for Defense,
Mr. Healey, explained the decision to abandon carrier avia-
tion in this way:
We shall keep our existing carrier force as long as
possible into the 1970' s, but we shall not order a
new carrier. In the light of the military tasks we
envisage, and of the operational return we can expect
from its cost of h 1,400 million over the next ten
years, we do not believe that we should be justified
in keeping a carrier force indefinitely. A new carrier
could not become operational until 1973, when the rest
of our carriers would be in the last phase of their
active life. By the mid-1970' s we should be able to
reprovide the necessary elements of the carriers'
capability more cheaply by other means. 25
The decision not to build the new carrier brought
about the resignation of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir
23 24










David Luce. Unlike Mr. Mayhew, the civilian head of the
Navy, the uniformed chief could not publicly explain the
exact reasons for his resignation. It has been suggested,
however, that Sir David resigned not so much because of the
cancellation of the carrier, but because of the fact that
without carriers effective military presence East of Suez
27
could not be maintained.
III. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT
The White Paper justified the decision not to build
a new carrier on the fact that during the 1970' s the deploy-
ment of British forces will be such as to obviate the neces-
sity for carriers.
Experience and study have shown that only one type .
of operation exists for which carriers and carrier-
borne aircraft would be indispensable: that is the
landing, or withdrawal, of troops against sophis-
ticated opposition outside the range of land based
air cover. y
The White Paper announced a plan under which land-based air-
craft would perform on a reduced scale the strike/reconnais-
sance and air defense functions which are presently assigned
29
to carrier aviation. The extent of reduction is seen when
26 — - "The New York Times _/late city edition/, February 23,
1966, p. 1, col. 6.
27Newsweek, March 7, 1966, p. 50.
28Cmnd., 2901, p. 10. 2 9Ibid .
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one considers the land bases outside the United Kingdom
which will be available in the 1970' s.
Britain's military presence outside Europe is de-
clared by the White Paper to be a function of the protection
of economic interests, the honoring of obligations and an
30interest in seeing peace maintained. However , the main-
tenance of this presence is made the subject of important
limitations
:
First Britain will not undertake major operations
of war except in cooperation with allies.
^Secondly, we will not accept an obligation to pro-
vide another country with military assistance unless
it is prepared to provide us with the facilities we
need to make such assistance effective in time.
Finally, there will be no attempt to maintain defense
facilities in an independent country against its
wishes. 31
. The deployment of British forces in the Mediterranean
will be reduced immediately. Gibraltar will be maintained
32
at present force levels, but there will be reductions in
33Cyprus and Malta. In effect, the Government of Malta is
told in the White Paper that they will have to assume a
larger part of their own defense burden. This is a refrain
which appears throughout the White Paper: the one-time
colonial power is telling its one-time colony that the new
30Cmnd. 2901, p. 6. 31Cmnd. 2901, p. 7.
32Cmnd. 2901, p. 8. 33Cmnd. 2901, p. 7. .
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nation must assume the financial burden of nationhood and
pay for its own defense.
In the Middle East and Far East— the area East of
Suez—a reduction is also scheduled. In 1968, forces will
be withdrawn from Aden, and there will be a slight increase
in the forces stationed in the Persian Gulf as compensa-
34 .tion. This prospective withdrawal of forces from Aden at
the time the South Arabian Federation achieves independence
brought an accusation of breach of agreement from the Con-
35
servatives. The Government's answer again adopted the
theme—assume the burden of nationhood. The agreements in
question were made with the semi-independent states which
will form the federation. Those agreements will lapse, in
the Government's view, when a new independent State comes
into being.
There is no question here of "ratting" on our commit-
ments. A country which wishes to become independent
cannot assert the conditions for its independence as
being exactly the same in the defence field as the
conditions which it enjoyed when it was a dependent
territory. 36
The Conservatives were not to be satisfied with this
answer, and during the full dress debate on the White Paper,
34Cmnd. 2901, p. 8. See also, Parliamentary Debates ,
Commons , Weekly Hansard, No. 682, col. 239.
35Parliamentary Debates , Commons , Weekly Hansard,
No. 682, col. 243.
36 Ibid. at col. 244.

16
Mr. J. Enoch Power, the shadow Defense Minister, provided
some strong evidence which weakens the Labor position on
Aden. Britain agreed in 1964 to convene a conference to fix
the date of independence for the South Arabian Federation,
such date to be not later than 1968. There wa£ further
agreement that this conference would conclude a defense
agreement "under which Britian would retain her military
37base at Aden for the defence of the Federation." Thus,
the Conservatives argued, Britain could not withdraw from
Aden in 1968 without breaking an already-existing commit-
ment.
The White Paper points out that the Far East and
Southern Asia is the area "where the greatest danger to
38peace may be in the next decade." British presence will
be maintained, but reduction of forces will take place as
37Parliamentary Debates, Commons , Daily Hansard,
March 7, 1966, Vol. 725, No. 62, Col. 1756. See also
"Federation of South Arabia, Conference Report," Parliamen-
tary Command Paper, Cmnd. 2414 (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1964), p. 3. "The delegates expressed
the desire that the constitutional status of Aden should be
raised to that of the other States of the Federation; and
they accordingly requested that British sovereignty be
renounced as soon as practicable, subject to the continued
exercise by the British Government of such pov/ers as may be
necessary for the defence of the Federation and the fulfill-
ment of Britain's world wide responsibilities. The Secre-
tary of State informed the delegates that the British
Government were prepared to accede to this request."
38Cmnd. 2901, p. 8.

17
soon as conditions permit. Facilities in Malaysia and
Singapore will be maintained as long as the Governments of
Malaysia and Singapore "agree that we should do so on
*'
. 39
acceptable conditions ." The White Paper reports that dis-
cussions have been begun with the Government of Australia
40
concerning military bases in that country if necessary.
However, the major part of military presence East of Suez
was explained in terms of the confrontation with Indonesia,
and during the debate, the Government put its position "on
the line" in stronger terms than those used in the White
Paper. Mr. Healey frankly stated that:
The fact is that Britain has got to stay east of
Suez in any case for many years. We have direct
responsibility for the internal security and ex-
ternal defence of territories which are unlikely
to become independent for some time yet.
The question is not whether we stay east of Suez,
but in what strength and for how long.^1
The White Paper also announced that substantial
forces would remain in Hong Kong but that forces would be
withdrawn from the Caribbean and the South African Terri-
tones.
39 Ibid . (Underscoring this author's.)
40,, . .Ibid .
41Parliamentary Debates , Commons , Daily Hansard,
March 7, 1966, Vol. 725, No. 62, Cols. 1779-1780.
42Cmnd. 2901, p. 8.
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On the issue of deployment of forces in Germany, the
White Paper declared that "we think it right to maintain our
43
.ground forces in Germany at about their existing level."
But there was a major proviso attached to this statement,
and that was that means must be found to meet the foreign
exchange costs of the British Army of the Rhine.
Further deployment of forces, then, is scheduled to
be limited to Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, the Persian Gulf,
Malaysia, and Borneo, and Hong Kong with forces in Germany
if, and it is a big if, the foreign exchange cost problem
can be solved. This deployment envisions a gradual but com-
plete withdrawal from Libya, Aden, Swazeland, Gan, and
British Guiana (now Guyana). It also envisions a reduction
in forces in Eastern Malaysia and Brunei as conditions per-
.. 44
mit.
The White Paper does not deal in terms of the numbers
of troops to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean or the area
East of Suez. However, the message is clear; there will be
reduction of overseas commitments to the extent required to
permit operation of the defense establishment with the
fixed budgetary ceiling.
43Cmnd. 2901, p. 6.
44
"Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1966, Part II.
Defence Estimates 1966-67," Cmnd. 2902 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), pp. 5-15.
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IV. AN INDEPENDENT POLICY
The White Paper declares that the "first purpose of
our armed forces will be to defend the freedom of the
. . 45British People." At first reading, this pronouncement
appears to indicate that when all else has been said Britain
would adopt a policy of independence if required in defense
of the home islands. But such an interpretation is incon-
sistent with much else in the White Paper. There is the
announcement that "Britain will not undertake major opera-
46tions of war except in cooperation with allies." The
conclusion is offered that "the security of these islands
47
still depends primarily on preventing war in Europe" and
that "continuation of the North Atlantic Alliance is vital
48
to our survival." Thus, the White Paper sets out a depend-
ent defense policy: allies, especially NATO, provide the
cornerstone of defense planning.
The question of the independence of British defense
policy was raised at the time the White Paper was made
public by the resignation of the Navy Minister. It will be
remembered that Mr. Mayhew's letter of resignation dealt
not with the fact that carrier aviation in the Royal Navy
45Cmnd. 2901, p. 4. • 4 6Ibid . , p. 7.
4 7Ibid




was to be phased out, but with his disagreement with the
political and strategic assumption on which Britain's policy
49
.was based. By custom, he was permitted to make a personal
statement in the House explaining his resignation, and he
took the opportunity presented to explain the nature of his
disagreement.
I shall try to show that the approach to the Defence
Review has been mistaken, that the proposed cuts in
resources are not matched by the proposed cuts in
commitments and that the result will be strain on the
Armed Forces, or dependence on the United States
beyond what this House should accept.
Although Mr. Mayhew • s concern for the strain on the
armed forces was genuine—his own experience at Dunkirk was
still too real—the more basic reason for his resignation
was that the policy of the White Paper made Britain too
dependent on the United States. "We shall be acting not as
a power in our own right, but an extension of United States
Power—not as Allies, but as auxiliaries of the United
States." 51
49See text at note 20, supra , p. 10.
50Parliamentary Debates , Commons , Daily Hansard,
February 22, 1966, Vol. 725, No. 53, Col. 255.
51 Ibid , at Col. 261. Mr. Mayhew was a member of the
first Territorial unit to land in France in September, 1939.
He was witness to the disaster which was caused by such
deployment of under-equipped and untrained forces. His
personal statement concluded with the kind of appeal which
marks a high moment in a parliamentary statement. "Most of
the men whom I knew then came back safely through Dunkirk.
But more would come back if they had the tanks and air

21
Much of the debate concerning dependency on the
United States concerned the decision to buy FlllA aircraft
.from the United States. The White Paper announced that the
FlllA would be bought to fill the gap in strike/reconnais-
sance aircraft which would occur in the 1970' s between the
time the present Canberras became obsolete and the Anglo/
52French variable geometry aircraft became operational.
This decision was made after considering using a British/
French aircraft, the Spey/Mirage, and a British aircraft,
53the Buccaneer 2, to do the job. Both of these were
54
rejected on the basis of performance and cost.
The point at issue was not the fact that an airplane
like the FlllA was required. In his personal statement, the
ex-Minister of Defense for the Royal Navy disposed of that
question; even the Navy agreed that it was essential to
obtain such an airplane.
It should be placed to the credit of the Admiralty
Board that from the beginning to the end of the
Defence Review it stoutly maintained that if we were
to remain east of Suez we should need FlllA* s for
the job as well as carriers. 55
support which they needed and deserved .... I am con-
vinced that the House will never allow that kind of thing
to happen again." See Daily Hansard, as cited, Col. 265.
52Cmnd. 2901, pp. 10-11.
53 54Ibid






February 22, 1966, Vol. 725, No. 53, Col. 256.
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There was to be no bomber/carrier controversy between the
Royal Navy and Royal Air Force such as had caused the
."Admiral's revolt" in- the U. S. Defense Department. The
objection was not to the plane itself, but to the fact that
it increased military and economic dependence on the United
States.
In his opening statement, the Secretary of State for
Defense said that the "foreign exchange cost of the FlllA
purchase will be met by sales of British equipment to the
United States and third countries." The Opposition
pointed out that it was not quite that simple, and that the
planes were to be bought on credit with an opportunity for
British firms to bid, without differential or tariff restric-
57tions , on orders for American equipment.
• Further dependency on the United States was announced
in the White Paper in the decision to use more C130's to
make good the shortcomings in the performance of the Belfast
58in air transport. This increased air-lift capability
takes on additional importance when viewed alongside the
decision to retire the mobility represented by carriers.
56Ibid., cols. 240-241.
5 7Ibid . , cols. 244-245.
Cmnd. 2901, p. 12.
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But if this is to be the policy of the future,__an
increasing dependence on long range aircraft ./the
FlllA's and the C130'js/, surely we shall have a
chain of bases .... The policy to ensure a chain
of new bases, such as the island base strategy, to
which very little reference is made in the White
Paper, would inevitably lead to further reliance
upon American equipment. 59
It is not only equipment that brings about the de-
pendence on the United States. Mr. Mayhew suggested, in his
personal statement, that the world role envisioned on the
limited funds available also brought about this dependency.
I cannot feel that it is right that a nation which
considers itself strong enough to take on a world
xole . . . can," at the same time, say it is too poor
to afford the sailors with the ships and equipment
that they need for the tasks they are ordered to
carry out. 60
Because the Government is unwilling to spend the money to
support a world role, the ability to play the role depends
on the' United States.
The White Paper policy would mean virtually taking
no action at all on our own initiative, even if
appealed to by those whom we are supposed to be
supporting. If they appeal for our help, we shall
stand idly by. Alternatively, v/e shall act with the
consent and support, or promised support, of our
vastly more powerful ally, the United States, and
the more we act the more we shall depend on their
support .... I come to the reviews' last line of
59Parliamentary Debates , Commons , Daily Hansard,
March 7, 1966, Vol. 725, No. 62, Col. 1850. .Sir John Eden
for the Opposition.
60Parliamentary Debates , Commons , Daily Hansard,
February 22, 1966, Vol." 725, No. 53, Col. 259.

24
defence: our allies—that is to say the Americans
—
will help us out. 1
The White Paper, then, does spell out a defense
policy which is clearly not one of complete independence.
There is dependence on allies—NATO and especially the
United States. There is a heavy dependence on the United
States for equipment, and the White Paper appears to further
that dependence. A question to be considered in a later
chapter is whether this dependence is so great as to pre-








After having considered the 1966 Defense White Paper,
it is now appropriate to examine some aspects of British
defense policy in days gone by. This chapter will deal with
the period from 1919 until 1939. A subsequent chapter will
consider British defense policy from 1945 until the present.
I. THE FIRST DECADE—IMPERIAL DEFENSE
A discussion of British Defense policy in the inter-
war period can be approached in various ways. There is no
better way, however, than to start with Sir Winston Spencer
Churchill's evaluation of the policy of the War Cabinet
which was announced after the Armistice in 1919. During the
course of the war, the British Empire had mobilized, and a
vast and efficient military machine had been created. In
1919, the War Cabinet decided that this machine should be
rapidly dismantled, and the service departments were told to
base their planning on the assumption that the "British
Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next
For an analysis of the contributions "of the compo-
nent parts of the Empire to the Allied victory in World War
I, see Donald Cowie, An Empire Prepared (London: George
Allen and Unwin Limited, 1939), pp. 40-151.
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ten years, and that no expeditionary forces will be re-
2quired." Churchill himself proposed, in 1928, that this
assumption be reiterated for another ten-year period, but he




3yearly by the Committee on Imperial Defense. The ten-year
rule remained in effect until 1932 when the MacDonald Govern-
ment abandoned it.
Since the British Governments of the decade of the
'twenties were proceeding on the basis of the "no war for
ten years" rule, it is understandable that the British
defense policy of the period reverted, in part, to the policy
of imperial defense. The duty of the Royal Navy was the
protection of the lines of communication to the Empire; the
duty of the Army was to act as an Imperial police force.
During the 1920 's then, the Navy had a mission which was
closer to its mission in war than was the mission assigned
to the Army. There is, of course, a quantitative distinc-
tion to be drawn between the peace-time and war-time mission
of the Navy; but protection of the sea lanes and preparation
for blockade were logical parts of Navy planning and prepa-
4
ration even in the 1920' s. Unlike the Navy, the Army had a
2Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 50.
3 Ibid.
4
W. F. Wentworth-Shields, The Empire on Guard (London:
Faber and Faber, Limited, 1938), pp. 43-45
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mission in the first decade of the inter-war period which was
quite dissimilar from its mission in war and was, indeed,
unlike the then existing tasks assigned to the other Armies
I
6f the world. The conscript Armies of the continent served
almost entirely at home and had the sole duty of protecting
land frontiers from invasion. The British Army usually had
about one half of its regular strength serving outside of the
United Kingdom and had developed a special system which was
responsive to its special requirements. In the 1920' s, the
mission of the Army was clear: First to provide garrisons
overseas; second, to reinforce these garrisons in time of
war; third, to defend the United Kingdom; fourth, to inter-
vene abroad on behalf of British interests. Its mission
stressed overseas responsibility and this primary responsi-
bility was later to be modified only because of air power.
The special system which the Army used to meet its
special requirements was the Cardwell System. Its main prin-
ciples were the maintenance of a Regular reserve and the use
of "Linked Battalions." The Regular soldier never really
lost his identification with his regiment. After his tour
of active service, he would return to civilian life with an
obligation to rejoin his regiment in an emergency. The rela-
tively small regular Army had a reserve of non-commissioned
Cowie, ojd. cit . , supra note 1, p. 177.
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officers and officers who could respond on short notice to
form the cadre of an expanded military establishment. The
"linked Battalion" system provided for a battalion at home
7
-and a battalion abroad for each regiment. The home battal-
ion handled training of recruits and provided the Regular
Army's defense reserve in the United Kingdom. The system
worked well and permitted the Army to discharge its respon-
sibilities as the imperial police force at a minimum of
cost. It was, however, not an easy task to transform this
establishment into a general war machine. However, in the
decade of the 'twenties, the "no war for ten years" rule
permitted Army planners to be unconcerned about this problem.
The "police" responsibilities of the Army during this
period were exercised in a number of ways. It would be . a .
mistake to conclude that the Army of the inter-war period
was strictly an army of peace. From 1919 until 1938, the
. Army was engaged in thirty-three significant "police actions"
in the service of the Empire. Some of these were small and
involved only a few men; in November of 193 7, company
strength forces were moved from Bermuda to Trinidad to quell
riots. However, other of the actions were large scale and
provided a testing ground for new tactical concepts. In
1922, unrest in Waziristan, India, saw the beginning of a
major action, which lasted until March, 1924. A total of
340,000 troops were employed during the two-year period.
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The job of policeman for the Empire could very well involve
large-scale military operations.
Military operations in India and the Middle East pro-
vided a testing ground for the new weapon of World War I
—
the airplane. Liddell Hart argues that the 1930 debate over
the significance of air power was really a useless argument
since air control had been in regular use for ten years in
7
the Middle East and had proved itself there. Aircraft had
also played their part in India, not only in reconnaissance
roles, but in carrying out bombing missions. British de-
fense policy in respect to Afghanistan, even in the early
1920's, assigned the primary role to the R.A.F. , and the
Indian Field Army was no longer expected to mount an Afghan
invasion. In 1922, the R.A.F. was assigned the responsi-
bility of the garrisoning of Iraq, and control was accom-
o
plished with air power instead of field forces.
If the above-described air operations proved the
importance of air power to British military thinkers as
Liddell- Hart argues, they also brought about a less desir-
able side effect. It was so much cheaper, in relative terms,
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Army that there was little attempt to develop interservice
tactics and strategy during the period. Black and white
comparisons were drawn: in India, 100 planes and 2,000
officers and men were able to accomplish a task which had
previously been the responsibility of 60,000 men of the
200,000-man Army in India. The cost of the garrison in Iraq
dropped from 20,000,000 pounds under the Army in 1920 to
1,500,000 under the R.A.F. in 1930. These comparisons led
to the conclusion that the R.A.F. could do exactly the same
job as the Army at one-tenth the cost; the Army was, accord-
ingly, denied appropriations which it needed to develop
itself into a fighting arm to move with the advance of air
power.
The airplane can probably claim with justification to
be the single most important piece of military hardware to
join the Empire's arsenal in the 'twenties.. But the tank
. was not far behind. In the period from 1927 to 1930, the
British Army became mechanized. Tanks were no longer an
instrument to be held in reserve and concentrated for the
decisive blow in a battle. They were also to be used as the
spearhead of the advance. In classic terms, they were to be
used as both heavy and light cavalry. It was well into the
1930 's before tank doctrine was completely understood by




started. One cannot help wondering if the German African
campaign might not have ended differently if this basic
change in military philosophy had not been accomplished in
the British Army in the inter-war period.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that British
defense policy in the first decade of the inter-war period
in respect to the Army and Air Force was a success. The
policy, as has been noted, was based on the "ten year rule,"
and that rule proved valid for the decade involved. The
Army accomplished its job as the Empire's policeman at a
cost to the British taxpayer which was not unbearable. New
doctrine was developed and the thinking, if not the equip-
ment, was superior to any in the world. The Air Force was
also growing as a separate service. Its mission was widen-
ing and it was demonstrating that it could take its place
alongside its sister services as an important and vital
component of imperial defense. What, however, of the Navy
during this period? In 1921, the Imperial Conference
declared that cooperation among the various portions of the
Empire was required to produce naval security and that
"equality with the naval strength of any other power is a
10
minimum standard for that purpose." Shortly after this
9Ibid
. , pp. 185-201.
Summary of the Transactions of the Conference of
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statement was made, the Washington Naval Conference con-
vened. The proceedings of the Conference indicate that
Britain obtained the desired minimum standard of "equality
with any other power." As a result of the agreements
reached at the Conference and the 5:5:3 formula, the Royal
Navy was on a par with the United States in capital ships.
This met the minimum standard, and it was met in a "contest"
with a genuinely friendly power. Relations between the
United States and Great Britain were certainly good, and
only a wild imagination could envision conflict between the
two. In Europe, Britain had the advantage over both the
12Italian and French fleets in a ratio of about 5 to 3.5.
Indeed, for some time after the Conference, Britain had an
advantage over the United States in a ratio of 5.8 to 5.2.
When H.M.S. Nelson and H.M.S. Rodney joined the fleet, four
older ships were scrapped, and the ratio was reduced from
5.5 to 5.2. There were differences in weight of metal which
the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United King-
dom, the Dominions and India, June 20-August 5, 1921, as
reproduced in "Present Problems of the Commonwealth of
British Nations," International Conciliation , No. 167,
October, 1921, p. 16.
See "Washington Conference on the Limitation of
Armaments," International Conciliation , No. 169, December,
1921, pp. 5-77.
12
G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of Inter-
national Affairs 1920-1939 (fourth edition; London: Oxford
University Press, 1964), pp. 63-65.
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tended to offset this advantage, however. The 16~inch guns
of U.S.S. West Virginia, U.S.S. Colorado, and U.S.S. Mary-
land had ranges of 34,500 yards compared to the maximum gun
in the Royal Navy, the 15-inch, 30,000-yard main battery in
H.M.S. Hood. 13
In terms of capital ships, the Royal Navy could not
be dissatisfied with the Washington Conference. The Confer-
ence put no limitations on cruisers and Britain was ahead
of any other nation in both numbers and ability to use these
"guardians of the life line of empire." The Naval position
was, therefore, equally as good as the positions of the
other services in the 'twenties. Problems were to come, and
perhaps should have been foreseen, but they were problems of
the next decade.
II. THE SECOND DECADE—DISARMAMENT
AND REARMAMENT
An acceptable starting point for a review of defense
policy in the second decade of the inter-war period is the
13For an interesting discussion of the Washington
Conference, see Frederick Moore, America' s Naval Challenge
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), pp. 77-103; for a
ship-by-ship analysis of the capital ships of both Navies
see Moore, op , cit
. , pp. 118-119. Although the U. S. Navy
could claim the heavier guns and the greater range, three
of the British ships (H.M.S. Renown, H.M.S. Hood, and H.M.S.
Repulse) could claim speeds of 31 knots. The newest and
best U. S. battleships could claim only 22 knots.
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Defense White Paper issued in 1935. Up until 1935, there
were separate votes on the estimates for each of the serv-
ices, and these votes generated parliamentary discussion on
defense matters. However, there was no debate of defense
aS a whole. In 1935, defense estimates were increased in
response to world affairs, and the Government felt that a
"debate on Imperial Defence as a whole" was in order. A
14 ...White Paper was issued which set forth the basic princi-
ples of British defense policy. The principal aim of
British foreign policy was proclaimed to be the establish-
ment of peace; the methods used to accomplish this were
varied but included the following:
1. Support of the League of Nations.
2. Promotion of international instruments designed
to produce security among nations such as:
a. Briand-Kellogg Pact
b. The Four-Power and Nine-Power Treaties
concerning the Far East.
c. The Locarno Treaties.
d. Proposals for increasing security in
Eastern Europe and the Danube basin.
3. The return into "the comity of nations all the
countries which have been enemies in the late
war," by suspension of reparations, membership
in the League, evacuation of the Rhineland, etc
14 . .See "White Paper on Defense Issued in connection
with the House of Commons Debate on March 11, 1935," Inter -
national Conciliation , No. 310, May, 1935, pp. 39-48.-
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4. Reduction and limitation of international
armaments. 15
These methods were declared in the White Paper to be
still part of the defense policy of the Government. But the
Government could no longer "close its eyes to the fact that
adequate defenses are still required for security." Uni-
lateral disarmament had not worked, and serious deficiencies
had accumulated in all services, and the danger point had
been reached. The increases in the Air Force begun in 1934
were to be speeded up, and the Army and Navy would be im-
proved by "supplying technical deficiencies, providing up-
to-date equipment and adequate personnel and reserves of
u • n „ 17war material.
The White Paper concluded with an assignment of serv-
ice missions. The Navy "is, as always, the first line of
18defense." In order that this first line have its proper
equipment, more cruisers were required immediately, and the
battle fleet had to be updated. Thus, the Washington Naval
Treaty and the London Treaty of 1930 would have to be re-
considered.
The Washington Naval Treaty, discussed above, dealt
only with capital ships. Age, not numbers or weight was the
problem in that category. The London Naval Treaty dealt
1 5 Ibid
. ,
pp. 39-41. 1 6Ibid . , p. 41.
1 7 Ibid ., p. 43. 1 8Ibid . , p. 44.
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with cruisers and smaller ships, and that is where the real
problem lie. The London Naval Treaty set limits on cruiser
.strength, and the Admiralty was responsible for the danger-
ously low limits which were set for Great Britain. Up until
1930, the Admiralty had insisted on seventy cruisers as the
absolute minimum; in 1930, it was decided that fifty was an
acceptable minimum. It is arguable that this decision was
made by the Admiralty because of the improved international
climate created by the spirit of Locarno and the Briand-
Kellogg Pact. Nonetheless, it was made, and Great Britain
was to suffer because of it. Another aspect of the London
Treaty which contributed to Britain's disadvantageous naval
position in 1935 was that portion of the treaty proclaiming
a five-year holiday in capital ship construction. Since the
Royal Navy ships covered by the Washington agreement were
older than the normal, Britain could not replace at the pace
originally envisioned at Washington by the Admiralty repre-
19
sentatives in 1920.
The Army was assigned its new mission in the White
Paper also. Defenses of ports, coastal defense, and anti-
aircraft defense were given high priority. Mechanization
19See Bernard Acworth, The Navy and the Next War
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Limited, 1934), pp. 55-67,
and 200-230; Gathorne Hardy, op . cit . , supra note 12, pp.




and modernization of equipment were included. The changing
mission of the Army now placed home defense first; in the
^920' s defense of the United Kingdom was its third mission
and the overseas garrisons and their reinforcement in war
came first and second, respectively. Now garrison duties
were second in importance, and by 1938, there was no rein-
21forcement mission left.
In the 1938 debates on the Army Estimates, this
change of mission and philosophy was spelled out in detail
by the then Secretary of State for War, Mr. Hore-Belisha.
The overseas garrisons were to be maintained in time of
peace at a strength which would be adequate for defense if
war should come. Local forces were to be used where pos-
sible, and those regular Army units which could be replaced
by local forces were to return to the United Kingdom. The
primary purpose of the Army was declared to be home defense.
Air attack was the major item to be defended against.
Internal security was also assigned as an Army responsi-
bility. The Territorial Army and the Regular Army together
22
were to accomplish these new tasks.
20White Paper, supra note 14, p. 46.
21Cowie, o_p_. cit . supra note 1, p. 178.
22Wentworth-Shields , 0£. cit . supra note 4, pp. 68-70
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"The Royal Air Force has, as its principal role, to
provide (with the cooperation of ground defenses) for the
protection of the United Kingdom and particularly London
23
against air attack." As indicated above, expansion of the
R.A.F. had begun in 1934, and the tempo was now increased.
Numbers of planes and numbers of pilots were increased, and
24
aircraft design and performance were improved.
By the time the Defense White Paper was issued in
March of 1938, progress could be reported. Most impressive,
perhaps, is the report of Navy tonnage building: from about
140,000 tons of shipping being built in 1935, the January 1,
1938, figure had risen to almost 350,000 tons. Two capital
ships, one aircraft carrier, and seven cruisers were under
construction. During the year, from April, 1938, to March,
1939, some sixty new ships were to be put in service. In-
dustrial production of armament for both the Army and Air
Force was reported on the increase. Fifty-nine new air
stations were acquired. Increases in personnel in all serv-
ices were reported, and Civil Defense preparations were under
25
way.
23White Paper, supra note 14, p. 4G.
24Wentworth-Shields, op_. cit . supra note 4, pp. 81-96,
25
"Statement Relating to Defence," Parliamentary Com-




By the time the 1939 White Paper was issued, more
progress could be reported. The civilian aspects of defense
planning, however, play the major part in the 1939 statement.
National Service, Air Raid Precautions, evaluation plans are
set forth as part of the Nation's defense policy. There is
an expression of determination in the White Paper that was
perhaps lacking in previous statements on defense.
. . . • But in the absence of a general reduction of
armaments it is inevitable that this country should
continue to take the steps necessary, in the light
of present developments, for its own protection and
for the discharge of its responsibilities elsewhere.
• . . His Majesty's Government ... are confident
that the people of this country will be ready to bear
the heavy burden involved, and will share the determi-
nation of His Majesty's Government to ensure the
adequacy of our Defence preparations . 26
In 1939, a study group of the Royal Institute of
International Affairs considered the issue of Imperial
defense in its study of the political and strategic inter-
27
ests of the United Kingdom. Defense of the Empire was
viewed as a matter of mutual assistance. The Dominions were
not able to look after their own interests in an adequate
fashion, and, by inference, the United Kingdom needed the
26
^Statement Relating to Defence," Parliamentary Com-
mand Paper, Cmd. 5944 (London: H. M. Stationery Office,
1939), p. 19.
27Royal Institute of International Affairs, Political
and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom
,
An Outline
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939).
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Dominions. No longer, however, did the United Kingdom take
the Empire to war with it, and the Dominions would have to
make their own decisions when the time came. Great Britain
unreservedly promised to go to the assistance of any
Dominion that was attacked. Imperial defense now had six
basic principles:
1. The defense of the British Isles from every likely
form of attack must be assured.
2. The self-governing Dominions must shoulder, and
indeed have accepted, the responsibility for
their own defense until such time as reinforce-
ments can reach them from other parts of the
Commonwealth.
3. India, with the help of the British elements of
the army and the Royal Air Force in India, is
responsible for her own defense.
4. The Colonies, fortresses, and protectorates are
held by British regular garrisons, in -some
cases reinforced by regular native troops or
by colonial volunteer forces, and in other
cases protected by native troops alone.
5. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force must keep
the sea communications of the Empire open.
6. An Imperial Reserve, in the form of a military
field force and air forces, must be available
to send as a reinforcement to any threatened
point. 28
Defense policy, as an aspect of a country's foreign
policy, must be judged by its results. If the main object







preservation of the peace, then the events of September,
1939, demonstrated the failure of the policy. However, if
the purpose of the policy is to be prepared for the war that
might come if the country's foreign policy fails, then a
different judgment might obtain. In the first decade of the
inter-war period, the "no war for ten years" rule proved
sound, and Imperial defense, as it then operated, was a
success. The British defense establishment integrated the
use of the airplane and the tank into its philosophy of
arms. There was no Billy Mitchell in the British Army, and
the Royal Air Force was accepted by her sister services with
an acceptable level of complaint. The Royal Navy, even with
its "notorious reserve," accepted aviation and the Fleet Air
Arm made progress in carrier use.
.In the second decade of the inter-war period, the
defense planners dropped the "ten year" rule; perhaps 1932
was a few years too late, but it was not disastrously late.
The major flaw to be found in the defense policy of the
'thirties is the attempt to force other nations to- disarm
by the example of unilateral disarmament. By 1935, the
Government could well admit that the policy had not worked.
In fairness, it must be admitted that the Government tried
to regain its lost ground. But the failures of British arms
in the early part of the war resulted most directly from the
fact that the lost ground could not be regained.
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As to the separate services in the 1930 's, the Navy,
it appears, comes off third best. The Washington Naval Con-
ference did very little, if anything, to put the Royal Navy
at an advantage. The London Conference gave too much ground
on the issue of cruisers, but even this was not a tragic
loss.
The threat of surface attacks was great, but the Graf
Spee and the Bismark were disposed of. The real flaw to be
found in the naval policy of the 'thirties is the lack of
appreciation of the submarine menace. The Anglo-German
Naval Agreement is not significant because of the 100:35
ratio; it is significant in that the German Navy could
build a submarine force of almost unlimited size. Not only
were the Navy's planners wrong in letting the Germans build
such a force, but they did far too little in developing an
anti-submarine warfare capability. When Churchill asked the
United States for ships, it was not for capital ships or
cruisers but for destroyers which could play an ASW role.
On balance, it is reasonable to conclude that British
defense policy in the inter-war period was clearly not a
failure. Indeed, it was more successful than many of the
1938-1939 commentators thought it would be. The British
Isles were defended, the Dominions remained free from
attack, the gates of India remained guarded, and the sea
lanes were kept open. The country was prepared for war; it
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was not as well prepared as it should have been, but perhaps
democratic nations never are.

CHAPTER III
POST WORLD WAR II
It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine
the policy or the strategy of the British defense establish-
ment during the Second World War. However, as a vehicle to
provide a means of transition from the previous discussion
of the inter-war period to a consideration of post-war
defense policy, it is appropriate to have in mind Churchill's
theme for his work on the Second World War: "In War: Reso-
lution; In Defeat: Defiance; In Victory: Magnaminity; In
Peace: Good Will." That briefly sums up British defense
policy during the war: resolution, defiance, and victory.
I. THE DECADES OF DECLINE
As World War II ended, Britain faced a new and un-
certain situation in world affairs. She had created a tre-
mendous war machine whose contributions to victory through-
out the world were, to say the least, major ones. But the
cost of the military victory had left the country a finan-
cial shadow of its former self, and the post-war world was
f
not the place in which immediate restoration of its economic
and financial situation was possible.
Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. viii.
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The development of a defense policy in the transi-
tional period was a major task for the new Labor Government
.in the United Kingdom. At the time of Germany's collapse,
there were over five million men and women in the British
armed forces, and approximately four million were involved
2in war production. Out of a total population of some
3fifty million, then, almost 20 per cent were directly in-
volved in the war machine. The major defense problem of
the immediate post-war period was the accomplishing of mas-
sive demobilization while at the same time maintaining a
defense posture which would permit the satisfactory comple-
tion of remaining missions and tasks.
The 1946 Defense White Paper set out these tasks:
The provision of our share of the forces to ensure
the execution by Germany and Japan of the terms of
surrender.
The provision of our share of the force's for the
occupation of Austria.
The provision of forces to maintain law and order
in Venezia Giulia.
The provision of forces to assist the Greek nation
in its recovery.
The provision of forces to enable us to carry out
our responsibilities in Palestine.
2
"Statement Relating to Defence," Parliamentary Com-
mand Paper, Cmd. 6743 (London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1946), p. 2.
3Joseph Whitaker, Whitaker's Almanack (London:
William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1946), p. 611.
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The liquidation of Japanese Occupation of Allied
territories in South-East Asia.
The maintenance of internal security and settled
conditions throughout the Empire.
*/
The safeguarding of our communications and the up-
keep of our bases.
4
The White Paper indicated that a defense establish-
ment of considerable size was still required to accomplish
the missions set forth above. Over one million men would
have to remain in uniform, and compulsory service under the
National Service Act was still to be required.
The lessons learned during the war years were not to
be lost, and the 1946 White Paper promised concrete pro-
posals to take advantage of the "development which has taken
place during the war in the central machinery for the con-
trol of our war effort." The promise was made good when a
white paper on "Central Organization for Defence" was pub-
7lished in October, 1946. This White Paper reviewed the
wartime arrangement whereby the Prime Minister assumed the
title of Minister of Defense and instituted the War Cabinet
p
and Chief of Staff Committee. It was concluded that this
4 5Cmd. 6743, pp. 4-5. Ibid . , p. 6.
Ibid
. , p. 8.
7
"Central Organisation for Defence," Parliamentary
Command Paper, Cmd. 6923 (London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1946).
8Cmd. 6923, p. 4.
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centralized control needed to be retained, but that the
peace-time political environment would preclude the Prime
Minister from maintaininq the function and the Defense Com-
9
mittee and a Ministry of Defense was established. The
Defense Committee, the Ministry, and the Chief of Staffs
Committee with a Joint Staff system were designed to provide
comprehensive defense proposals which would ensure that "the
resources available for defence are laid out to the best
advantage in terms of manpower, weapons and equipment, works
... , „10services, amenities, etc."
Britain had, then, an organization for defense which
incorporated the lessons learned in World War II, and it had
certain missions and tasks to be accomplished. The main
problem which faced the defense planners during the immedi-
ate post-war period was that of the reduction of manpower
and the almost unbearable costs involved in overseas secu-
rity. Notwithstanding Churchill's disclaimer — "I have not
become the King's First Minister to preside over the liquida-
tion of the British Empire"—the Empire was liquidated in
large measure. No longer did Britain have the far-flung
Empire to provide military and naval bases around the world.
9Cmd. 6923, p. 6. 1 Ibid .
11 .William P. Snyder, The Politics of British Defense
Policy, 1945-1962 (/n.p^/: Ohio State University Press,
1964), pp. 11 and 226-230.
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Some bases were retained through the sufferance of the new
nation who had left colony status behind. In other situa-
tions, the bases were simply not available. By 1954, the
7
concept of an air-lifted central strategic reserve came into
being. In that year, the Government proposed that there be
a gradual reduction in the size of the Army, and that it be
reconstituted in Britain as a strategic reserve ready to fly
12
to trouble spots which still required British intervention.
The second half of the answer to the question of mobility
was found in the "Commando." This Navy solution took the
World War II term and created an entirely different unit.
Aircraft carriers were modified to carry personnel and
equipment of a Royal Marine Commando and, hence, floating
bases were provided which could respond to a crisis anywhere
13in the world.
During this same post-war period, Britain also faced
the dilemma of the nuclear weapon. Britain had had a part
in the development of the atomic bombs which ended the
Japanese War. She continued development of her own bomb
until in 1953 the Government embarked on a program to
14develop a strategic nuclear force. This force was based
oh bomber delivered weapons, and it used as its model the






U. S. Strategic Air Command, Hence, Britain, her Empire
gone and her once supreme world financial position lost for-
ever, still could claim a place among the nuclear giants.
It was during this same post-war period that Britain
-entered into the alliance system which was a radical depar-
ture from established principle of the past. The obliga-
tions of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO were a clear departure from
the traditional maritime strategy of the past. Britain
found itself with a permanent military commitment on the
Continent almost without knowing why. The invasion of 1944
was an obvious necessity, and the occupation responsibili-
ties were a logical consequence. However, before the
occupation ended, the Cold War had intensified and NATO
became the next reasonable step. The United States became
involved in Korea, and Britain was left to shoulder a much
heavier burden in Europe than had been anticipated. Gradu-
ally, and because there was simply no other alternative,
Britain accepted its roll in the alliance structure and by
the mid-fifties Sir Anthony Eden could observe that an
effective defense system in Western Europe was essential to
the security of the United Kingdom. The nation which had
historically relied on its Navy and had refused alliances in






By the mid-fifties then, Britain had responded with
viable solutions to the problems in defense raised in the
first decade after World War II. Her response had cost
money, but she was still, in her view, a world power to be
reckoned with. But there were disquieting signs: except
for period of war, defense expenditures had not in the past
exceeded 3 per cent of the Gross National Product. In con-
trast, in 1952, almost 12 per cent of the G.N. P. was going
to defense. Rapid technological change and loss of over-
seas bases had forced security costs up and up. In order
to do as well in the second decade after World War II, con-
tinued high or even higher defense investment could be
required. There would be new problems in the decade between
1955 and 1965. Could they be solved as effectively as those
in the. period between 1945 and 1955? Suez provided part of
the answer, and it was in the negative.
The Suez crises provided clear evidence that the
British defense establishment was, indeed, living in a
changing world. The pressure brought by the United States
and the Soviet Union, coupled with the economic, drain of
the enterprise itself, soon resulted in the withdrawal of
British and French forces. It had become absolutely clear
that the gulf between national resources and political
17desire on the international scene could not be ignored.
1 6
Ibid ., pp. 33-40.
1 7 Ibid
. , pp. 229-235.
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In the decade after Suez, an attempt was made to ad-
just Britain's defense position in the light of her economic
resources. In 1962. the Conservative Government set forth
the basic objectives of British defense policy in its Par-
no
liamentary Command Paper on defense. The objectives were
threefold: to maintain the security of the country; to
carry out obligations for the protection of British terri-
tories overseas and of "those to whom we owe a special duty
by treaty or otherwise"; and to make a contribution to free
world defense through various individual and collective
19
security arrangements. The statement declared the Govern-
ment's support of disarmament and then proceeded to outline
the forces and policies that would be used to achieve the
desired defense objectives. Insurance was required, de-
clared the statement, against the possible loss of fixed
installations overseas by keeping men and heavy equipment
afloat and by increasing the air and sea lift capability of
20the Strategic Reserve. The statement further indicated
that there would be a balance of nuclear and conventional
forces and that there would be continued support for
Britain's alliance responsibilities.
18
"Statement on Defence, 1962, The Next Five Years,"
Parliamentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 1639 (London: Her Maj-
esty's Stationery Office, 1962).
Cmnd. 1639, pp. 3-4. Ibid . , p. 6.
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In February, 1965, the Labor Government published its
21
revision to the Conservative-drafted "five year plan."
There was a restatement of policy objectives: the guarantee
I
of national security and a continual effort toward peace
and stability in the world as a whole. These objectives
were declared to be inseparable and unattainable by armed
22force alone. The Labor Government also indicated its sup-
port of disarmament in stronger terms than those used by the
Conservative Government. However, there were still the
practical realizations that effective disarmament was a long
way off, and the Government indicated that reliance must
still be placed on the alliance system. "Meanwhile, Britain's
security will depend on alliances with her friends in many
parts of the world. Interdependence is the only basis for
23
national security in the nuclear age." There were three
major roles seen for the British defense establishment in
1965: support of a nuclear force; a contribution toward the
defense of Western Europe through NATO; and assistance in
keeping the peace elsewhere in the world. However, the
Government declared there must be a constant review of the
balance among the three roles in order that defense
21
"Statement on Defence Estimates, 1965," Parlia-
mentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 2.592 (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1965).
22 23 -Ibid
. , p. 5. Ibid . , p. 4.
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expenditures could be reconciled with other claims, domestic
24in nature on the national economy.
There was a proposal contained in the 1965 statement
for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, and Britain offered to make
available to the Western Alliance her nuclear capability
and to subject it to collective authority.
During 1965, a major change in the British defense
establishment was completed. The Defence (Transfer of
25Function) Act, 1964, provided for the complete unification
of the headquarters level of the three services. From the
days of World War II, when Churchill took the office of
Defense Minister, this unification process continued to
develop. In effect, this legislation provided the culmina-
tion of the efforts at centralization of defense in peace-
26time which were begun by the Atlee Government in 1946.
With the 1964 Act, the separate service departments were
abolished and a central defense ministry took over their
functions. The positions of First Lord of the Admiralty,
Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for Air
disappeared as did the Admiralty, War Office and Air





25Eliz. II, ch. 15.




control for both defense policy and the machinery for the
administration of the three services. The lines of au-
thority and responsibility from the Secretary of State for
Defense ran unbroken through military, scientific, and
27
administrative chains of command.
The unified defense establishment was a product, at
least in part, of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Louis Mount-
batten, and it was through his influence that the military
chief of the defense establishment, the Chief of the Defense
Staff, was given tremendous power. The advice of the Chief
of Staff Committee is presented to the Secretary of State
by the Chief of the Defense Staff alone. Promotions to flag
or general rank are taken out of the hands of the Service
Chiefs and given to the Chief of the Defense Staff. It is
not surprising to learn that Mountbatten was the Chief of
Defense Staff at the time these changes were recommended.
The headquarters integration has resulted in unified
field commands for the British forces around the world. An
Air Marshall is in charge in the Middle East, and the Royal
Navy and Army units under his command look to him and not
their Service Chiefs in London for control.
The Royal Navy today provides an interesting picture
of the adjustments made by Britain in the two decades
27Alden Hatch, The Mountbattens : The Last Royal
Success Story (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 400-7.
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following World War II and shows progress made in preparing
for a new and different role. Quintin Hogg, a sometime
First Lord of the Admiralty, has commented on the forward-
[looking Britain and has urged a new and expanding role for
28
the Navy. "The two-power Navy which sailed to Jutland
belching smoke from her coal—or latest innovation, oil-
fired boiler rooms—is as remote as the fleets of Nelson or
29
of Drake • • . . " None the less, there is a major part to
be played by the new Navy. Hogg argues that the advantages
of a sea-based conventional force with carriers and strike
aircraft has been consistently undervalued by the British
and that the continuing loss of, and expense of, land bases
require a "supply train of fleet auxiliaries constantly at
,.30sea."
.There is some evidence that Hogg's advice was being
followed prior to the 1966 Defense White Paper. For the
first time since World War II, the Royal Navy began to
experience expansion in equipment and manpower. During the
five-year period up to the end of 1964, approximately eighty
new or reconstructed warships joined the fleet. Three new
cruisers and four guided missile destroyers took station
28Quentin Hogg, "Britain Looks Forward," Foreign
Affairs
, 43:409-25, April, 1965.
Ibid




with twenty-five new frigates. The building program was
relatively extensive with thirty-four new ships under con-
struction. It is important to note that five of these ships
were fleet auxiliaries: two replenishment ships, and three
replenishment tankers. Progress was being made in the
development of Hogg's "supply train."
The Royal Navy now has four carriers in commission
and one in reserve. The recently refitted H.M.S. Eagle is
the largest and most powerful (44,100 tons) and ranks with
any U. S. conventionally powered carrier. The Navy has also
made progress with its Commando carriers and cruisers and
has kept pace with the U. S. Navy in design (but not, of
course, in numbers) in this field. The Royal Navy entered
the nuclear submarine field when H.M.S. Dreadnought was
•
launched and two more nuclear submarines Valiant and War-
31
spite are under construction.
The Royal Marine situation also provides some insight
into the current British defense posture. The primary role
of the Corps is to provide specialist assault troops in the
sea-borne forces. There is a Marine Commando brigade at
Singapore with two commandos (seven hundred men) with their
attached Light Regiment, Royal Artillery. One Commando is
31Raymond V. B. Blackrnan (ed.), Jane's Fighting




in Malaysian Borneo. There is a Commando at Aden which
responded to the call of the Tanganyikan Government for help
in the suppression of mutiny by native troops. There are
other Commandos in the United Kingdom as part of the Stra-
tegic reserve. One of these units deployed early in 1964
to Kenya within forty-eight hours of call. Experience, thus
far, has shown that the Royal Marine Commando is an almost
perfect answer to the mobile-quick deploying force required
in an age of fewer and fewer fixed bases. The Marines also
provide specialist amphibious units to carry out reconnais-
sance, small raids and deep penetrations. The Corps ful-
fills the traditional role of providing detachment in Her
32Majesty's ships. The Royal Marines discharge their respon-
sibilities with less than ten thousand men. (The U. S.
Marine. Corps has over two hundred thousand men) . The Marines
with the Royal Navy's Commando carriers have contributed
significantly to making the adjustments in defense required
in the 1955-1965 time period.
II. PROBLEM AREAS
The problems of defense which faced Britain during
the post-war years were many and varied, but they generally
32Col. A. P. Willasey-Wilsey, R.M. , "The Royal




divide themselves into four areas: conventional forces,
nuclear arms, alliances, and general policy matters.
Naturally, the economic problems of the country made them-
selves felt in all four areas but for convenience (and hope-
fully for clarity) the problems will be discussed in terms
of the four broad areas.
There are some general problems which faced not only
the British Government but also the British people and the
man in uniform. Indeed, some of the problems face the
United States in the same way. There is no answer or solu-
tion to some of these, but they exist none the same and
honesty requires that they be recognized.
Firstly, there is the adjustment that must be made
when a nation is called upon to make significant economic
sacrifice for defense when the nation knows true defense is
an impossibility. A certain futility is given to the whole
33defense discussion. This feeling is perhaps stronger in
Great Britain than in the United States because they have
been in a position of utter vulnerability for almost two
decades.
This feeling of frustration with the purpose of
defense was further deepened by the Suez crisis. Suez
33James L. Moulton, Defence in a. Changing World
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964), pp. 17-18.
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brought home, as no amount of writing or debate could, the
unpleasant fact that Britain was a second-rate military
power. This realization of impotency was traumatic; regard-
7
less of the reasons, the armed forces of the British Crown
were beaten by the Egyptians and revenge was impossible. It
is no wonder that questions were raised as to the wisdom of
substantial investment in defense—-it was impossible really
to provide defense, and the defense establishment could not
even win a small action to preserve the famous "life line."
This same feeling of impotency was to appear again in the
34Skybolt/Polaris controversy to be discussed below.
There is another general factor which has created a
problem for the professional military man in Britain as it
has in the United States. Disarmament has been a policy of
both Conservative and Labor Governments since World War II.
The Labor Government in its 1965 Defense White Paper de-
35
clared it to be a goal of British defense policy. The
confusion caused in some military minds by the Government's
position on disarmament has further contributed to the
frustration noted above.
These problems face not only Britain, but to varying










but it is probably a healthy sign that they are at least
recognized and discussed.
Discussion of the problems which Britain faced in the
1
field of conventional forces can be reduced to the issue of
resources. Could the country provide forces in sufficiently
large numbers to do the job assigned? Britain's "thin red
line" stretched from the United Kingdom to Gibraltar, Malta,
Cyprus, Aden, Singapore, and on to Hong Kong. None of the
bases is completely secure; concern has been expressed over
Spain's interest in Gibraltar to China's threat to Hong
Kong. Singapore is a self-governing nation, and Cyprus and
even Malta are independent countries. There was Arab pres-
sure on Aden and the base at Singapore will probably have to
be evacuated by 1970. The cost of these bases is high.
.
Aden costs over $150 million a year, and Singapore about
36$650 million. However, in the controversy over the
British role "East of Suez," Wilson was a supporter of
. . 37British strength in the East of Suez area. The develop-
ment of a base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean showed
Wilson's intentions in the area. Britain has spent about
eight and one-half million dollars thus far on the new base.
36
"Great Britain. A New Beginning?," Time , November
19, 1965, pp. 45-46.
37
Editorial in The New York Times , October 22, 1965.
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Wilson is quoted as having said, "we will maintain our posi-
38tion East of Suez."
Notwithstanding the present Government's commitment
East of Suez, conventional forces were reduced in an economy
move. The British Government had to decide whether to order
a new fighter for the R.A.F. or to commission a new carrier
39plane for the Royal Navy. This decision was made in the
light of the Government's declared intention to cut defense
40
spending by $280 million dollars in 1965. Indeed, on
August 4, 1965, the Labor Defense Minister announced that
over 616 million dollars had been trimmed from the budget.
He indicated that three military aircraft projects had
already been canceled but that no decision had been made on
.the F-lll. He noted that the Government fully intended "to'
reduce- the defense budget from 7 to 6 per cent of the Gross
National Product. Some of this saving would affect NATO,
and this aspect will be discussed shortly.
In the conventional area, the British had more pedes-
trian problems which, when compared to the broad policy
matters above, are almost comical. Problems they are,
» * 38
"Great Britain. A New Beginning?," loc . cit
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39
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however, and they exist in the United States also. The
British no longer have conscription and proudly say that
peace-time conscription is not part of the British way of
doing things. However, the absence of conscription brought
about recruiting problems which were especially severe in
an era of low unemployment. Pay increases and other fringe
benefits have been adopted to improve the recruiting climate,
but these have increased the manpower costs of the services.
Money was spent in public relations and advertising with
mixed results. On October 6, 1965, the Chief of Air Staff
announced that the Royal Air Force was about to reach the
point where it would join the Army in having more wives and
41
children of air men than air men themselves. Let the
Government and Opposition fight out the East of Suez contro-
versy; the Chief of Air Staff was concerned about where the
new babies of R.A.F. fathers would live.
As has been noted previously, the British developed
a strategic nuclear bomber force which, in the middle and
late •fifties, was of the caliber, if not the size, of the
U. S. Strategic Air Command. The British felt their stra-
tegic nuclear force was an effective deterrent, and the
Government policy received support from all but the pacifist
left. Much was spent on development and production of the
41News item in The New York Times , October 7, 1965.
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"V" series aircraft and the Vulcan, Victor, and Valiant with
their R.A.F. crews were a match for the Strategic Air Com-
mand planes and men in the U. S. Air Force. It was recog-
nized that these aircraft would be obsolete in the early
'sixties, and development of systems to follow the bombers
began in the early 'fifties. The Blue Streak Missile was
to be a hard site weapon with a range between U. S.
intermediate-range and intercontinental-range missiles. A
second project was undertaken in the Blue Steel "standoff"
weapon; this weapon would make use of the bomber force but
the launching aircraft could fire the weapon one hundred
miles from target to avoid local air defense. Both these
weapons represented logical follow-ons, and in the planning
stages, they appeared to respond adequately to the chal-
lenges of expanding missile technology.
By 1960, there were serious problems, and Blue Streak
was canceled. The reasons were painfully obvious: it cost
too much. The abortive effort in the missile field ended
in failure. The British people paid almost $300 million in
this attempt to keep pace with the U. S. and U.S.S.R., and
they had nothing to show for it. Skybolt, an American mis-
sile, was to replace it. Skybolt was not unlike Blue Steel,
but it had a much greater range, one thousand miles, and
Britain had the bomber force to support it. Britain was
still in the nuclear race, and money had been saved. Then

64
came the December, 1962, announcement that the United. States
had canceled Skybolt, and Britain found herself without a
replacement system for Blue Steel whose useful life, even
' 42
extended, would terminate in 1966-1968.
President Kennedy suggested Polaris as the substitute
for Skybolt, and the Nassau Agreement signified British
acceptance. One might think that the Royal Navy would have
welcomed the opportunity to take over the future of the
British strategic nuclear deterrent, but such was not the
case. The Navy thought Polaris would down grade the rest
of the service and reluctantly took on the task of develop-
43ing a nuclear polaris submarine. However, the project
was undertaken and has met with considerable success. The
.program is on schedule and deployment of the first opera-
tional submarine is expected in mid-1968. The submarines
will have the capability of accepting the fourth generation
Poseidon when it becomes available.
The submarines are a combination of American and
British technique and tradition, and are not simply carbon
copies of the U. S. model. The warheads to be used will be
44British although they will be carried on American missiles.
42 Snyder, o_p_. cit . supra note 11, pp. 24-32, 151-204;
Moulton, o_p_. cit . supra note 33, pp. 57-77.
43 Snyder, op. cit . supra note 11, pp. 128-129.
44Robert Lindsey, "U.K. Polaris Program on Schedule,"
U.J5. Naval Institute Proceedings , October 1965, pp. 154-158.
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The program has not been entirely without its prob-
lems, however. Some have been serious and may well delay
the operational target date for the program. H.M.S. Dread-
7
nought is a non-polaris atomic submarine which was to pro-
vide operational experience for nuclear crews. She has
been recently withdrawn from service because of dangerous
metal failures. A series of hair-line fractures have
developed in welds in the hull. The program for the four
45polaris submarines will probably be delayed.
The polaris program has had other problems, at least
one of which has been resolved to the satisfaction of all
concerned. The New York Times reported on August 22, 1965,
that a six-week labor dispute which affected the Vickers
yard constructing the polaris submarines had been settled.-
The dispute involved twelve skilled workers v/ho had been
prohibited from making tea during work hours. Vice Admiral
Hugh Stirling Mackenzie, British Polaris program executive,
is reported to have expressed satisfaction that the work
schedule would be resumed.
By 1968, if the program succeeds, Britain will have
a modern nuclear deterrent. But it will be completely
dependent on the United States for this deterrent. The
45
"Notebook," U. S_. Naval Institute Proceedings
,
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Labor Government has already offered to turn this force over
to NATO. Britain, for economic reasons in the main, has
lost any hope of a position of even relative equality in
the nuclear race.
The Conservative and Labor Governments of the past
twenty years have supported NATO and, indeed, there has been
some feeling among the U. S. military that the British con-
tribution was the only one that could really be counted on.
But a permanent military commitment within the framework of
a multilateral alliance is still un-British, and there is
occasionally a suggestion of reducing NATO contribution.
The reason for reduction is, however, not that the principle
of interdependence is wrong, but that the economy cannot
take the strain. In 1957, the British Army of the Rhine
was reduced from eighty thousand to about fifty-five
thousand men, and it has remained at that figure ever since.
It now appears that further reductions may occur. The Labor
defense chief has argued that present strategic concepts
are based on the no longer valid idea that a nuclear con-
flict would last for several months. He argues that the
possibility of nuclear war has diminished and the forces
46
committed to NATO in Germany could be used elsewhere.
46
"Britain Shies at Cost of Policing the World,"
Business Week, March 13, 1965, pp. 32-34.

67
This argument is in the nature of a rationalization since
the real and obvious reason for reducing the NATO commit-
ment is economic. The British overseas defense cost makes
*
47
up half of the balance of payment deficit; the British
have worked hard to get Germany to absorb some of the cost
of the B.O.A.R. In past years, the Germans have made "off-
set" purchases which have helped considerably. For 1964-
1966, the amount of these purchases decreased, and Wilson
has been forced to consider seriously reduction of the
48Rhine Army. The British defense budget is, relative to
G.N. P., the largest in Europe and is exceeded only by the
United States. There have been recent attempts at McNamara
style economies but real savings can come only from manpower
cuts. In view of the intent of the Government to reduce the
defense budget to 6 per cent of the G.N. P., the reduction of
NATO forces seems inevitable.
It seems clear that Britain has not found satis-
factory solutions to the defense problems it has faced in
this second decade since the war. The reasons are basically
economic, and the non-British observer can find room for
criticism. The United States spends almost half of its tax
dollar for defense, whereas the British spend about one
47News item in The New ' York Times
,
August 5, 1965.
48Supra note 46, p. 66.
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quarter. The percentage of G.N. P. is not as significantly
different, but the United States is still higher. It is
^obvious that a greater percentage is spent on "socialism"
in Britain, and an American can argue that some of this
should be diverted to defense.
Britain is going into its defense reductions with
open eyes, and a reduced voice in world affairs may be a
willingly-accepted consequence. Moulton argues that public
opinion is the final arbiter of defense policy; and, if this
be the case, the British are willing to accept the conse-
quences of reduction in defense. Perhaps, the reduction
can somehow be reconciled with closer ties to Europe. Only
time will explain where Britain will go from here.
All of this has meaning for the United States. In
49
an article in The New Republic , Stephen Hugh-Jones dis-
cusses the "grand Anglo-American strategy that stretches
from Kenya to California." He points out that the United
States has responsibility in northeast and continental
southeast Asia, plus the Pacific, which the British have had
responsibility for Malaysia, the Indian Ocean, the Persian
Gulf, and East Africa. And the British have held up their
end of things in an admirable fashion. From the Suez crisis
49Stephen Hugh-Jones, "How Much Can Britain Defend?,"
The New Republic
, August 21, 1965, pp. 11-12.
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until this past year, the United States was permanently
represented in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area by a small
sea plane tender with accompanying destroyers. A British
•.
Withdrawal from the East of Suez position would leave a
power vacuum, and we would have to fill it. The British
nuclear umbrella (V bombers based in Malaysia) protects the
sub-continent and, as recently as a year ago, India's Prime
Minister Shastri accepted reassurances of this continuing
protection. Withdrawal from the area or obsolescence of the
British nuclear strategic force will leave a void to be
filled by the United States.
Far too little has the United States realized the
British contribution in the Far and Middle East. The
defense problems facing Britain today will be our problems
.
tomorrow unless some satisfactory solutions can be worked
out. As Churchill said of another period of high defense
expenditures— "Of course we shall do it in the end?" But,
at what cost? It is evident that the United States is
making some preparation to fill the vacuum when and if it
occurs. The new Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia will be
a joint U. S. -British effort. The important defense prob-
lems facing the United States today are closely connected





A recent book review in The New York Times contains a
paragraph which might provide an answer to the question as
to whether the 1966 Defense White Paper sets out a new or
traditional defense policy for Britain. "There were more
men in the Royal Navy at that date _/the summer of 1797/ than
there are today, though the population was only a sixth of
its present size." One thing is clear: the British
defense establishment in 1966 is far smaller than it has
been in the past. However, that fact provides only a par-
tial answer to the question of whether the present policy is
a departure from the traditional. It may be possible to
implement traditional policy with fewer men and less equip-
ment. Size, then, is not necessarily an accurate indicator
of a change in policy. The only fair way to answer the
question as to whether the 1966 Defense White Paper sets out
a new policy is to isolate those traditional elements found
in Britain's defense planning and to test the White Paper
against them.
Christopher Lloyd, "Jack Tar in Revolt," The New
York Times Book Review





It is obvious that British defense policy today has
/
as its primary aim the "defence of the Kingdom." This has
been the aim of the policy created by British defense plan-
ners for the last two centuries. It is perhaps an over-
simplification to state that British defense planning has
been defensive and not aggressive in nature, but such has
been and is the case. Long before the United States Defense
Department was created, the term "Defence" appeared in
British titles relating to military and naval matters. In
the period between World War I and World War II, the Com-
mittee on Imperial Defence provided high-level policy deci-
sions and, during World War II, the Prime Minister took for
himself the title of Defense Minister. This is not to say
that British military planners cut out for themselves a
completely defensive role. Indeed, there were times when
defense required plans to attack, and the old saw—the best
defense is a good offense—found its place in British mili-
tary thinking. That having been said, however , a tradi-
tipnal element of British military planning is defense and





British defense policy traditionally not only pro-
vided for the "defence of the Kingdom" but also took into
consideration the defense of the Sovereign's "territories
and dominions beyond the Seas." It has been noted that,
during the inter-war period, the subject of imperial defense
was one of the most important aspects of British defense
thinking. The Royal Navy was responsible for keeping open
the lines of communications, and the Army had the duty of
acting as the imperial police force. In the period immedi-
ately after World War II, this element of British defense
policy still played an important part in defense planning.
The 1946 Defense White Paper still listed as a task of the
defense establishment the "maintenance of internal security
2
and settled conditions throughout the Empire." In the
middle 'fifties, the air-lifted central strategic reserve
was developed to fill the need once filled by the chain of
bases and deployed battalions of the Cardwell System. The
recent experiences in Aden clearly demonstrate that the
responsibilities of the imperial police force still exist,
and the White Paper itself contains language such as "the
2
"Statement Relating to Defence," Parliamentary
Command Paper, Cmd. 6743 (London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1946), p. 5. See also Chapter III, supra , pp. 45-47
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garrison, airfield, naval dockyard and other establishments
3
will continue to be maintained."
It states the obvious to observe that the conditions
under which "imperial defence" now operates are much differ-
ent than those existing in the decade of the 'twenties or
even the late 'forties and early 'fifties. Nevertheless, the
traditional element of imperial defense, which has histori-
cally been a part of British defense planning, is present
today. The scope of responsibility has lessened as the
Empire has contracted; the means of exercising the responsi-
bility has changed as modern weaponry has evolved. But the
fact of responsibility remains, and imperial defense exists
4
as a traditional element in the 1966 Defense White Paper.
3
"Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1966, Part I.
The Defence Review," Parliamentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 2901
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), p. 8.
4 . .There are many examples of the deployment of British
forces in recent years in the exercise of imperial police
duties. In our own hemisphere, Royal Marines and the Welsh
Fusilliers saw recent duty in Georgetown, then British
Guiana. Aden, Singapore and Hong Kong provide other examples.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the modern day im-
perial defense function can be found in the deployment of a
Royal Marine Commando to East Africa in 1964. After Kenya
had become independent, an internal Army revolt threatened
the new government. The British were requested as a Common-
wealth partner to send forces to put down the internal dis-
turbances. A Commando was air-lifted in and the revolt was
terminated. This action was in exercise of the imperial
police function. More interestingly, however, it is a com-
ment on the faith which the new Kenya Government was willing
to put in the British. After a long and sometimes bloody




It has been a traditional, if sometimes obliquely
•expressed, aspect of British defense policy that the Forces
should have available the newest and best weaponry obtain-
able. This is an ancient tradition which goes back to the
time when the sides of ships were first pierced to make the
broadside a possibility. That action made obsolete the
Spanish mounted guns which could be used only on the fore-
castle and poop of a man of war. During this century, the
introduction of the tank and the airplane into the Imperial
Arsenal demonstrates the continuation of the tradition.
British contributions to the field of carrier aviation and
the development of radar and asdic are also in this tradi-
tion. Within the last two decades the amphibious assault
ship—the commando carrier—combined the American expertise
in amphibious warfare with the concept of vertical envelop-
ment.
that independence was granted, the "colonial master" was
invited to return with an armed force to destroy the armed
forces of the new nation. There was complete faith that the
"colonial master" would leave as soon as the job was done,
and full independence would not suffer. Of course, the
Royal Marines did leave when the revolt was terminated. One
wonders—at least this writer does—if the French would be
invited to return in force to Algeria to put down an Army
revolt. It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine
the remaining mystic of the Commonwealth. However, this kind
of faith in the British by the ex-colony shows that in some
small way the British must have done something right.
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It is arguable that the British involvement with
nuclear power and nuclear weapons i's a modern manifestation
•of this ancient tradition. It is impossible to point to
historical examples, and thereby establish the traditional
aspects, of the use of atomic power if one treats atomic
power as an item sui generis . However, viewed as a develop-
ment in the field of weaponry, one finds that the 1966 White
Paper carries on a traditional aspect of British defense
policy.
It has been earlier observed that the British par-
ticipated in the development of the atomic bomb in World
War II. The value of atomic power for use as a weapon and
as a source of power for propulsion and for light and heat
was not lost on the British. The cost of development was
tremendous, however, and cooperation with the United States
was viewed as a means of providing the new weapon at a
bearable cost. Cost and the awesome power of the atom it-
self led to "interdependence" with the United States.
In 1958, the Defense White Paper acknowledged this
interdependence. "Today no country can hope to gain any-
thing by war." Interdependence and collective security
were twin props in defense planning. Britain had her
"Report of Defence, Britain's Contribution to Peace
and Security," Parliamentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 363
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), p. 2.
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nuclear deterrent, but "it cannot be compared in magnitude
to that of the United States." In matters relating to the
.development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, ballis-
tic rockets and nuclear submarines progress was being made
with the cooperation of the United States. However, the
White Paper made it clear that these developments were in-
tended to provide British arms which would be used as part
of a collective effort. After all, there was still a feel-
ing in Great Britain that the United States, although far
and away the most powerful member 'of the alliance, had
learned and still could learn from the British how world-
7
wide military and naval strength could be used. Britain's
partnership with the United States in the weapons field set
her apart from any other nation. The McMahon Act amendments
had favored Britain and, in 1958, Britain could with justi-
fication look down on the rest of Europe from her position
o
in the nuclear club. There was some sort of a special
relationship between Great Britain and the United States,
and the British felt that it was a good thing. The rela-




7See generally, N. H. Gibbs, The Origins of Imperial
Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 23-24.
Q
Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance (London: Oxford
University Press, 1964), pp. 56-66.
9Herbert Nicholas, Britain and the U.S..A. (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 166-180.
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The 1960 Defense White Paper could claim that
Britain had a flexible defense establishment which could
.meet challenges anywhere in the world. Wider cooperation
in defense research was urged with the United States, but
the White Paper could claim progress with an "All-British"
nuclear submarine and with guided missiles.
But 1960 also marked the turning point in Britain's
participation in the development of a guided missile
arsenal. Britain had realized in the 1950' s that the manned
bomber was not going to last forever as the ultimate weapon,
and development was started on a follow-on delivery system.
Blue streak was to be a liquid fuel missile designed for
launching from a hard site. The 1958 Defense White Paper
had claimed progress in the development of such a missile.
The missile was to have a range between that of the U. S.
intermediate- and intercontinental-range missiles. At the
same time, a "stand off" weapon, Blue Steel, was under
development. This weapon would be carried by long-range
bombers, but it could be fired at a considerable distance
from target and would, hence, extend both the range and life
10
"Report on Defence," Parliamentary Command Paper,
Cmnd. 952 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960).




of the bomber fleet. Both of these weapons were respon-
sive to the demands of the new generation of weaponry and,
although not on a scale with American or Russian develop-
ments, could assure Britain a significant voice in world
affairs.
But Blue Streak—the liquid fuel hard site missile
—
had to be canceled in 1960. There were two main reasons for
this decision: first, the cost was too high; second, there
was a good and relatively cheap alternative available.
There was a third reason of lesser importance and that is
technical in nature. A liquid fuel missile is a more vul-
nerable thing than a solid fuel missile, and this fact was
recognized by the British. However, the evidence seems
clear that cost was the main reason for cancellation of the
13project. The British had invested over 100 million pounds
in the missile, and the estimates of completion cost went
as high as 600 million. This was simply too much for the
British economy to bear. The Conservative Government had
tried to provide Britain with a genuinely independent
nuclear deterrent; it failed because of cost. As Harold
'12
. .William P. .Snyder, The Politics of British Defense
Policy , 1945-1962 (/n.p^/: Ohio State University Press,
1964), pp. 24-33.
13Harold Wilson, Purpose in Politics (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), pp. 165-179; Snyder, op. cit .
supra note 12, p. 28.
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Wilson pointed out to the House of Commons at that time—the
investment in Blue Streak would have paid for housing sub-
14Sidies for twenty years. Full development of the missile
might have paid for one hundred years of subsidies, and no
British Government was going to stay in office with that
kind of a defense policy.
At the same time of cancellation, the United States
developed Skybolt which was to replace the Blue Streak.
Skybolt was not unlike Blue Steel, but it has a greater
range—up to one thousand miles. With the range of the
Victor bombers extended by the one thousand miles, the Sky-
bolt missile was not a bad second choice.
Before proceeding to the Skybolt cancellation and the
Nassau agreement, it would be well to evaluate the meaning
of the Blue Streak affair. The development of Blue Streak
represents a forthright attempt by the British to provide a
modern up-to-date weapon which would be responsive to the
demands of modern war technology and which would provide
the greatest amount of protection—in a deterrent sense
—
consistent with the available resources of the nation. Blue
Streak failed on an economic basis; the cost was simply too
I
high. The original plans to develop the weapon were consis-
tent with the traditional policy of providing the Forces
Wilson, cjo. cit . supra note 13, p. 178.
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with modern weaponry. The decision to cancel Blue Streak
was not inconsistent with this tradition because there was
.an alternative- weapon available—Skybolt—which apparently
could have provided a similar protection at a more accept-
able cost.
There is another aspect of the Blue Streak affair
and the subsequent Skybolt cancellation which makes it
significant in a discussion of British defense policy.
That, of course, is the aspect of increased dependence on
the United States. More of that later, since it is part of
the "new" approach to defense planning found in the 1966
White Paper.
The discussions concerning dependence on the United
States, which followed the publication of the 1966 Defense
White Paper, overshadowed those aspects of the White Paper
which evidence the continuation of the traditional policy
of providing modern up-to-date weapons for the armed forces.
This policy with respect to weaponry is stated in the White
Paper in the following language:
Our forces must always possess enough of the arms and
equipment required for the day-to-day tasks of peace-
keeping throughout the world: it is also essential
,
» that they should have some advanced weapons which can
deter potential enemies from raising the level of a
local conflict to a degree which might threaten
world peace. We are determined to maintain a proper
balance of capability in both these fields. 15
l^cmnd. 2901, p. 9. (Underscoring this author's.)
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The White Paper indicated that there would be further expan-
sion of the Polaris program and that new aircraft—the F111A
.would be obtained. Regardless of the fact that these two
weapon systems would increase dependence on the United
States, it must be admitted" that they will bring the most
advanced kind of equipment into the British war chest.
The White Paper also announced the introduction of a
1^
new guided missile ship into the fleet. The Type 82
Guided Missile destroyers will be about 5,650 tons and will
be slightly larger than the present County Class destroyers.
Their design has been centered on a powerful new weapons
system. They will be fully stabilized to provide a steady
platform and will have a hull which will permit sea-keeping
and high speeds in all weather.
• The ships will be fitted with the latest in equip-
ment. There will be an Action Data Automation weapons
system to compute information for a new radar set up. The
radar has been developed by the British in cooperation with
17the Royal Netherlands Navy.
The ship will have surface to air/surface to surface
16Cmnd. 2901, p. 9.
17British Information Service News Release, February
24, 1966. British Information Services, New York.
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missile— the Seadart—and an anti-submarine weapon system
—
the Ikara.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new class
ships in terms of providing the Navy with modern equipment
is found in its propulsion system. A combination of steam
and gas turbine will be used. The machinery will be oper-
ated remotely from a ship control center and will include
19
an automatic steering capability. Development of this new
propulsion system will result in a significant savings in
20
weight and space of machinery and fuel. The United States
Navy is vitally interested in this propulsion system, and
cannot, at this point in time, lay claim to anything as
advanced as the new British system. It seems clear then
that the 1966 White Paper carries on the traditional aspect
of British defense policy by which the British fighting man
has access to the newest weapon and equipment.
International Organizations and Disarmament
Recent history underlies the importance to Britain,
as to all other countries, of strengthening the
United Nations as the main instrument for keeping
peace .... the only certain solution would be an
v
1 ft
Ibid. ; see also Cmnd. 2909, p. 9.
19British Information Service News Release, supra
note 17, p. 81.
20See generally, "British to Have All Gas Turbine




international agreement to control both the produc-
tion and supply of armaments. This, too, remains a
major aim of British policy. 21
The above quotation states the British position with
respect to the United Nations and disarmament as found in
the 1966 White Paper. Deletion of the words "United
Nations" and insertion of the words "League of : Nations"
would make the statement an accurate representation of the
22
expressed policy in the middle 'thirties. However,
British defense planners are realistic men, and the policy
statements in support of the international organizations and
disarmament always conclude with a caveat that, since
neither, vehicle has been able to insure lasting peace, the
nation must make provision for its own defense.
In the 'thirties, Britain experimented with uni-
lateral disarmament, and it found the experiment a costly
one. There is no evidence to suggest that current planning
envisions such an experiment again. However, there is a
group of British thinkers who have been leaders in the dis-
armament field, and some of these men have been very close
to, if not in, policy-making positions in the British
Government. Writers in the field of Deterrence and
2lCmnd. 2901, p. 4.
22See Chapter I, note 16 supra
, p. 8, for a compari-





Disarmament can be categorized in various ways. One conven-
ient method of consideration provides for a three-way break
down: Peace Movement Disarmers, Deterrence and Defense, and
23Anti-Communist Armers. The first group—Peace Movement
Disarmers—is made up of individuals with widely-differing
views, but there is general agreement that nuclear weapons
must be destroyed. Included among the nuclear pacifists in
this group are Lord Russell and C. P. Snow. Men such as
Russell and Snow certainly have a more direct effect on
policy-making in a Labor Government than their ideological
brothers—Pauling, for example—have on policy making in a
Democratic Administration in the United States. Russell is
convinced that the risks of unilateral disarmament are less
than the risks of nuclear war. Snow has argued that a
nuclear destruction of the world is a certainty unless
24
nuclear disarmament comes about. The official efforts of
Lord Cardigan and Lord Chalfont demonstrate that there is
some official acceptance of these positions in the Labor
Government's approach to disarmament.
It seems clear that declared support of international
organizations and disarmament is a traditional aspect of
23William R. Van Cleave, "The Nuclear Weapons Debate,"
U. _S. Naval Institute Proceedings








British defense planning. It is also clear that there are
times when this support is more of form than of substance.
.However, it is probably true that there is a more genuine
feeling for unilateral disarmament in official circles in
Britain than in the
#
United States and that the present
expression of support for disarmament in the White Paper
goes further than is immediately apparent.
II. THE NEW
It has almost been a "Hornbook" rule that a discussion
of traditional British defense policy and, indeed, even for-
eign policy, should begin with the proposition that Britain
stayed out of alliances. For at least 150 years, this
proposition held water, and the balance of power system
operated on the basis of Britain's providing the "swingman."
During the inter-war period, Britain tried to return to its
non-European orientation just as the United States tried to
return to its policy of avoiding "entangling foreign alli-
ances." World War II taught both countries many lessons,
and high on the list of lessons learned was the value of
alliances. British defense policy in the post-World War II
r
era was definitely pro-alliance and with varying degrees of
effectiveness NATO, SEATO, and CENTO replaced the independ-
ent maritime strategy of past British policy.
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The 1966 White Paper declares continued support for
NATO, but there is an indication that changes are forth-
coming. This is not to say that Britain will disassociate
herself with the alliances that were set up in the decade of
the 'fifties. But it is clear that those alliances have
changed and that defense policy will change with them.
Twenty years of alliances have led to "interdepend-
ence" and that "interdependence" has provided a new aspect
of defense policy. Interdependence is not a new item in the
1966 White Paper; it has been present before. The 1966
White Paper may face it a bit more honestly than past White
Papers have done.
There are two events in recent history which have
demonstrated that acknowledgment of interdependence must be
treated as a significant aspect of British defense planning.
The first was Suez; the second was Skybolt.- Suez demon-
strated that action independent of the United States or the
Soviet Union was simply no longer possible. Skybolt demon-
strated that interdependence has become dependence on the
United States.
The Blue Streak affair has been discussed above, and
r
it has been observed that its development was an attempt to
provide a modern up-to-date weapon which would be responsive
to the requirements of modern weaponry. It is generally
agreed that its cancellation marked the end of the British
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attempt to maintain a genuinely independent means of deliv-.
25 . .
ering a nuclear weapon. The decision not to go forward
with the Blue Streak missile was made by the British them-
selves and did not represent the result of U. S. pressure. •
The Suez Crisis had demonstrated that their capability for
truly-independent action was severely restricted. Blue
Streak was proposed in the aftermath of Suez in part to
demonstrate that the British still could act with a signi-
ficant degree of independence notwithstanding Suez. Then,
primarily for reasons of cost and the domestic political
consequences of a policy of massive defense expenditure, the
independent delivery system was abandoned.
The United States offered the British Skybolt as an
alternative. At the time, there was no clear understanding
as to the British financial participation in its develop-
26
ment. By 1962, the Kennedy Administration decided Skybolt
was not worth producing and announced its cancellation in a
somewhat cavalier fashion. The British reacted violently,
and President Kennedy was genuinely surprised at the crisis
25See generally, Wilson, ap_. cit . supra note 13, pp.
24-33; see also James L. Moulton, Defence in a. Changing
World (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode , 1964), pp. 57-77.
26Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965), p. 564. This conclusion is supported by the
record of debate in the House of Commons at the time of the
Blue Streak cancellation. See generally, Wilson, op_. cit .




which the cancellation caused. A major rift in Anglo-
American relations was possible, and the Macmillan Govern-
ment was put in jeopardy. The Nassau conference attempted
to save the situation; Kennedy offered to continue the
development of Skybolt if the British would pick up half
the cost. The British Prime Minister would not accept the
28proposition. The Prime Minister was in an awkward posi-
tion and the future of the Conservative Government probably
rested on the results of the Nassau conference. Polaris was
the obvious alternative, and an offer was made of Polaris to
the British. The Nassau conference concluded with a joint
communique which was sufficiently unclear to meet both U. S.
and British requirements. The communique indicated that the
provision of the missiles was with the understanding that
they would be part of the development of a multilateral NATO
nuclear force. However, the British made it clear that they
would be used for the purposes of international defense of
the Western alliance "except where Her Majesty's Government
29
may decide that supreme national interests were at stake."
The multilateral nature of the offer was directed at the
27Sorensen, op_. cit . supra note 26, pp. 564-576.
28Francis Boyd, British Politics in Transition , 194 5 -








particularly the French—and was designed
to counter charges of pro-British discrimination. The
British were free to interpret the communique as giving them
independent control when they decided the situation demanded
it.
The Skybolt/Polaris controversy was the final act in
the drama of independence, interdependence, and dependence
on the United States. The basic decision had been made when
Blue Streak was canceled. Britain's deterrent was no longer
independent but was dependent on the United States. The
. . . . 30British—or many of them—did not see it that way. The
Nassau agreement was presented by the Government as a
"guarantee of independence of the British nuclear deterrent
31for an indefinite time ahead." The Opposition and the"
Europeans could argue that it made the British nuclear capa-
32bility forever dependent on the United States.
At the time, Harold Wilson saw the issues presented
by the Nassau agreement in broader terms. However, his
speech in Commons on January 31, 1963, was made two weeks
30See, for example, Bell, ojd. cit . supra note 8,
pp. 78-79.
31Kenneth Younger, Changing Perspectives in British





before he became Labor leader, and he admitted that it did
not represent entirely the Labor position. He indicated
#
that the Nassau agreement and the debate it caused raised
three major questions: First, was the exchange of Polaris
for Skybolt a proper move? Second, could Britain maintain
an independent nuclear deterrent? Third, if not, what
should defense priorities be? He argues that independence
died with Blue Streak and, from that point in time onward,
any discussion of it was an illusion. Britain should forget
about the non-existing independence and put her defense into
33NATO and other "conventional" commitments.




It will not surprise the reader to discover that
there is no clear answer to the question originally used in
this thesis, to wit: Does the 1966 Defense White Paper set
forth a new or a traditional defense policy for Great
Britain? On one hand, the White Paper incorporates much
that is traditional in British defense planning. On the
other, it contains "new" elements—not necessarily new in
the sense, that 1966 provided the first indication of their
existence, but "new" in the sense that they have never
before been so honestly presented or so vigorously dis-
cussed.
The traditional elements are important and, indeed,
provide the basis for most of the current defense policy.
Perhaps the most important traditional element is that of
imperial defense. It is probably improper to call it that
today—fulfillment of overseas responsibility is the more
modern term. The White Paper makes it clear that there will
be maintained a military presence East of Suez. The "Thin
Red Line" is thinner than it has been in the past, but it
is there. There may be a fallback from Aden to another base
in the Persian Gulf area; there may be a withdrawal from
Singapore to Australia if necessary. But Britain still
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will be represented in the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and
Malay Peninsula.
British armed forces will be furnished with the best
weapons obtainable to do their job. Dependence on the
United States notwithstanding, they will have Polaris and
the FlllA. The Royal Navy will have a guided missile ship
with a conventional propulsion system superior to any ship
in the world.
The Commando carriers and the air-lifted strategic
reserve will still respond to calls for assistance from
fellow Commonwealth members in East Africa and the Malay
Peninsula, and the South Atlantic squadron v/ill still be
available to respond to a disturbance in the Faulkland
Islands when the situation demands. As the system of alli-
ances which grew out of World War II modifies itself with
the changing times, the British will be present to carry
their share of responsibilities.
All of the tradition aspects of defense policy, how-
ever, will be governed by controls which are, in the long
view, new to British defense planning. The control is
basically one of cost, and cost, more than anything else,
has created an increased dependence on the United States.
For the first time in recent history, Britain has acknowl-
edged that cost will determine the mission of its defense
establishment. No longer will the policy makers set forth
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tasks to be accomplished and then determine the resources
required to accomplish them. From here on out, the tasks
.will be a function of a fixed monetary figure. If the 1966
White Paper has a genuinely new element in it, this is it.
The whole argument about dependence on the United States
flows from this. This fixed cost of defense ' simply will
not permit the independent development of a nuclear delivery
system, so Polaris will be used. The fixed cost will not
permit independent development of either a new generation
of Victor bombers or Canberra aircraft so the United States
will furnish F111A and C130 aircraft. Cost will not permit
the development of a new carrier force, so there will be
none.
This is the new aspect of British defense planning
which the 1966 White Paper proclaims. The White Paper
states this basic policy decision and the reason for it.
"Military strength is of little value if it is achieved at
the expense of economic health .... We plan, therefore,
to bring our defense expenditure down . . . ."
This policy is the creation of Harold Wilson, and it
does not necessarily represent a consensus within the Labor
Party. During the debate on the White Paper, it took rela-
2tively objective Liberal Party to point this out. The
1Cmnd. 2901, p. 1.
2Parliamentary Debates , Commons, Official Report,
5th Series, Vol. V^b, Cols. 18"29-lb3b.
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Liberal defense spokesman, Mr. Emlyn Hooson, used the Labor
Party's 1964 defense position paper as his touch stone, and
.he demonstrated in instance after instance where the White
Paper differed from the party's policy. The maintenance of
a nuclear deterrent, the assignment of the V bombers to
other than NATO responsibilities, the continuation of
Polaris, the continued improvement of conventional equip-
ment—all these were cited as violations of Labor's 1964
defense manifesto, as indeed they were. The responsibility
for the 1966 policy and its inconsistencies with approved
party policy were laid at Wilson's feet. "There is no
sphere in which the Labour Party has broken as many promises
----- 3
as in defence."
Harold Wilson recognized that, for Britain, cost of
defense must determine policy long before the 1966 White
Paper was issued. He further realized that independence was
a function of cost and, therefore, that independence was
gone. For him, Suez decided the issue of independence in
the conventional field and Blue Streak in the nuclear. He
also considered the argument that a limited degree of in-
dependence must be maintained in order that the British
b
f
could act as a restraining influence on the United States.





United States would act without consultation when there was
4
a clear threat to her security.
For reasons of cost, Harold Wilson has deliberately
put his nation in a position of further dependence on the
United States. By 1970, every major weapon used by the
British armed forces will be an American product. In the
nuclear field, these weapons will have British warheads,
but the delivery vehicles will be American. British forces
will remain East of Suez' and' the NATO contribution will be
maintained in Germany as long as Wilson's fixed cost
philosophy permits. Cooperation with the United States in
the Indian Ocean at Diego-Garcia will permit reduction of
the cost in that area.
For Harold Wilson, the 1966 Defense White Paper does
not establish a new defense policy for the United Kingdom.
It does set forth the policy in a manner which has never
been used before. Defense policies will, henceforth, be
determined on the basis of a fixed cost; within that limita-
tion, Britain will exercise her responsibility to the
fullest.
In the past, Wilson has said: We believe that a
nation's greatness depends not on prestige military policies,
4Harold Wilson, Purpose in Politics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1964), pp. 194-207; see also John Manden, Great




but on the influence we have exerted in the forum of world
5
opinion." The defense policy announced in the 1966 White
Paper will give him an opportunity to test that belief.
5Wilson,
<
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